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Article

Dangerous Times: The FDA’s Role in
Information Production, Past and Future
Amy Kapczynski †
INTRODUCTION
These are challenging times for the Food and Drug Administration. Congress passed a so-called right-to-try law in May
2018, sharply limiting the Agency’s oversight of the use of experimental drugs. 1 Nearly the only thing the lame duck Congress
could agree upon in 2016 was that the FDA should lower its regulatory standards to speed drugs to market.2 The resulting 21st
Century Cures Act urges the Agency to approve drugs with less
evidence, but gives the Agency no significant new tools to ensure
that companies produce adequate data after a drug enters the
market. 3 The Agency also faces profound challenges in the
courts. Drug companies have successfully leveraged recent developments in commercial free speech doctrine to call into question the constitutionality of the Agency’s restrictions on drug
marketing, particularly regarding unapproved (off-label) uses of
approved drugs. 4
Proponents argue that these developments will yield better,
faster access to cures. For the most part, these proposed changes
† Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Faculty Co-Director, Global Health
Justice Partnership; Faculty Co-Director, Collaboration for Research Integrity
and Transparency Copyright © 2018 by Amy Kapczynski.
1. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-176, 132 Stat. 1372 (2018).
2. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).
3. See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, New “21st Century Cures” Legislation: Speed and Ease vs. Science, 317 JAMA 581, 581 (2017).
4. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 169 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that
the government cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, construe the misbranding provision of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to criminalize off-label
speech itself ); Amarin Pharma v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(holding that drug companies have a commercial speech right to make off-label
claims that are not false or misleading and barring the FDA from using such
speech as evidence of misbranding).
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are instead likely to put patients in danger and lead to wasteful
spending. To understand why, we first need a shared understanding of the central purpose of the FDA’s regulation of drug
marketing. That mission is commonly described as paternalistic
in nature: via pre-market review, the FDA protects us from unsafe medicines. Another prominent view asserts that the justification for the FDA’s regulatory power comes from information
asymmetries between consumers and companies: by certifying
the quality of medicines, the FDA helps consumers make good
choices. Both of these arguments have come under sustained attack recently, the first from certain patients’ groups and conservative advocacy groups that object to the paternalism it implies, and the second from scholars and advocates who believe
that decentralized certification would be more efficient.
Neither of these two visions provides the best justification
for the FDA’s regulatory power over the marketing of medicines.
As Rebecca Eisenberg has suggested, the FDA in its modern
form aims primarily to address a problem of information production. 5 The core function of the FDA as a drug regulator, as I will
elaborate below, is not to make choices for the public, or to certify
the truth, but to generate and validate information about medicines.
We need the FDA to play this role because it is, quite simply,
extraordinarily hard to know whether something is or is not a
cure. By controlling marketing, the FDA targets a distortion inherent to systems that rely on the profit motive and patents to
generate clinical trial data: it encourages the creation of highquality evidence about medicines that is not biased toward positive results. (By “positive” I mean results that appear to favor
the safety or efficacy of the drug.) Critically, the Agency also validates evidence about medicines—an activity that is more intensive than what is implied by the term certification. Evaluating
the qualities of drugs, as I will describe, has very little in common with rating hotel rooms or warrantying used cars. A typical
FDA new drug review involves hundreds of thousands of pages
of data, and may require reviewers to rerun data analyses, to
query companies for more information, and to closely scrutinize
individual trial records. Validation of the results of drug trials
requires significant expertise, significant resources, and access
to all of the relevant clinical trial data. While markets sometimes
5. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy,
13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 370 (2007).
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produce viable third-party certifiers, they cannot produce adequate third-party validators, absent major interventions that effectively turn third parties into smaller, independent versions of
regulatory agencies.
In the pages that follow, I first aim briefly to explain these
claims in more detail and show that the most persuasive justification for the FDA’s modern regulatory approach stems from the
enormous challenges associated with producing and validating
high-quality information about medicines. The point is underappreciated both in the academic literature and in policy debates,
and is critical to understanding the problems with the recent
challenges to the FDA’s drug regulatory authority that are
sketched above. Such changes might bring compounds more
quickly to patients. But they also plausibly could bring about a
world where we know less and less about the medicines we put
in our bodies.
Understanding the FDA’s information production role, I’ll
show, allows us to see more clearly the danger of immensely popular right-to-try laws. It also helps highlight the grave dangers
of emerging First Amendment law that asks judges rather than
regulators to determine what is true about a drug. Finally, the
information production lens also clarifies the stakes of the FDA’s
implementation of the 21st Century Cures Act. In particular, it
makes plain that the implementation of that Act must be preceded by a much more complete account of the reliability of regulatory decisions made on accelerated timelines and with less
evidence. Any move to lower regulatory standards should also be
avoided until we have a better understanding of why postmarketing study requirements are so rarely fulfilled in a timely fashion, and until FDA has the resources and authority needed to
alter this fact.
I. THE FDA’S INFORMATION PRODUCTION FUNCTION
Since the 1960s, the FDA has exerted profound regulatory
power over new medicines. 6 The Agency exercises that power
primarily by controlling drug marketing. No company may promote any new drug—or any existing drug for a new use—without
first providing “substantial evidence” of the safety and efficacy
6. For a description of the unusual power of the FDA as a U.S. regulatory
body, and a sweeping history of the development of the Agency’s powers, see
DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010).
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of that medicine for a specific use. 7 This premarket review system was refined over many decades, and has had a profound
global influence. 8
Key developments in the drug regulatory process typically
have followed from highly publicized tragedies. The most salient
was the thalidomide disaster. 9 Used to prevent morning sickness
in pregnancy, the drug caused thousands of children in Europe
and Australia to be born without limbs, or to suffer other forms
of organ damage or even death. 10 The United States was largely
spared because of the stubborn—now legendary—refusal of FDA
reviewer Dr. Frances Kelsey to approve the marketing of the
drug in this country. 11 The event deeply shaped the public’s perception of the Agency, and helped justify significant expansions
in its regulatory authority. 12 It is therefore not surprising that
the FDA’s purpose is commonly described first and foremost in
paternalistic terms, as a project of protecting consumers from
dangerous products.13
7. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2001) (prohibiting the marketing of a new drug prior
to FDA approval); id. § 355(d) (requiring drug sponsors to provide “substantial
evidence” of a drug’s safety and effectiveness with respect to the specific use in
the proposed labeling and defining “substantial evidence” as “evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations”). Accordingly, if a drug sponsor wishes to add a new use to an existing
drug’s label, the sponsor must conduct studies that demonstrate the drug’s
safety and efficacy for the proposed new use.
8. CARPENTER, supra note 6, at 687 (noting that “the FDA influence[s] . . .
international politics and [the] political economy of pharmaceuticals more than
any other regulatory Agency,” and “has become a setter of standards for technological, scientific, economic, and cultural development in medicine”). The
Agency also has had profound influence over modern practices of evidence-based
drug development. For example, it was FDA regulators that invented the familiar stages of clinical trial development. Id. at 278–80, 292–95; see also Richard
A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82
VA. L. REV. 1753, 1777–82 (1996) (describing the FDA’s oversight of clinical trial
design for pharmaceutical research and its development of requirements and
guidelines for clinical trials).
9. CARPENTER, supra note 6.
10. Id. at 119.
11. Id. at 242–48.
12. See id. at 238–45 (describing the public impact of the thalidomide example); id. at 230 (describing the link between the tragedy and the 1962
Kefauver-Harris Amendments as well as the 1963 Investigational New Drug
Amendments). Advocates for reform used the averted tragedy to argue that the
system could not over the long term rely on the heroism of individual reviewers
but needed structural changes—for example, to remove the default rule that a
drug was approved after sixty days absent objections. Id. at 254.
13. Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation and Regulation in the
Drug Industry, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2007) (describing
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This paternalistic justification has been sharply criticized in
recent years. Patients with grave diseases, libertarian critics,
and conservative think tanks have all argued that the government has no business protecting people from risks that they wish
to take. 14 The power of this critique is exemplified by the recent
wave of so-called right-to-try laws, which passed in forty
states,15 and very recently into federal law. These laws seek to
make it easier for patients to access unapproved drugs. 16 Though
they differ in their details, the state laws typically purport to
permit manufacturers to market unapproved drugs to terminally ill patients, and immunize companies from liability for any
adverse effects. 17 They had little practical effect, because their
main provisions were preempted by federal FDA law.18 Now,
however, Congress has adopted a similar law at the federal level,
the conventional account that “drug regulation is essentially paternalistic because it seeks to protect the misinformed consumer from better-informed
sellers”); see also Merrill, supra note 8, at 1776 (describing one perception of the
FDA’s post-1962 role as a gatekeeper that prevents harmful or ineffective drugs
from entering the market); What We Do, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
WhatWeDo (last visited June 18, 2018) (“ The Food and Drug Administration is
responsible for protecting the public health by ensuring the safety, efficacy, and
security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, and medical devices . . . .”).
14. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 367–68 (describing the objection that
“patients may be harmed by disease as well as by drugs,” and the role of patient
advocates in criticizing this justification); see also Richard A. Epstein, Against
Permititis: Why Voluntary Organizations Should Regulate the Use of Cancer
Drugs, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1, 11–13 (2009) (providing a libertarian critique);
Karlyn Bowman & Joseph Kosten, From the Archives: Pharmaceuticals, the
FDA, and the Drug Lag, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.aei
.org/publication/from-the-archives-pharmaceuticals-the-fda-and-the-drug-lag
(criticizing the FDA for delaying access to new drugs purportedly being used to
effectively treat patients in other countries).
15. According to the Goldwater Institute, the main proponent of the rightto-try movement, forty states had right-to-try laws, as of June 2018. Goldwater
Inst., Right to Try in Your State, RIGHT TO TRY, http://www.righttotry.org/in
-your-state (last visited June 18, 2018); see generally DARCY OLSEN, THE RIGHT
TO TRY: HOW THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PREVENTS AMERICANS FROM GETTING THE LIFESAVING TREATMENTS THEY NEED (2015) (describing the Goldwater Institute’s role in promoting these laws).
16. Goldwater Inst., About Right to Try, RIGHT TO TRY, http://www
.righttotry.org/about-right-to-try (last visited June 18, 2018) (advocating for
right-to-try laws on these grounds).
17. Lisa Kearns & Alison Bateman-House, Who Stands to Benefit? Right to
Try Law Provisions and Implications, 51 THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI.
170, 170–71, 174 (2017) (noting variations and commonalities among state
right-to-try laws).
18. David Farber, et al., How Right to Try State Laws Create False Expectations, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG, https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20150522.047884/full (May 22, 2015).
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with very significant potential implications for our regulatory
system.19
Some people who see government paternalism as problematic nonetheless see a legitimate role for the FDA in addressing
a particular kind of market failure rooted in information asymmetries. 20 On this account, because consumers know far less
than companies about the safety and efficacy of drugs, “in the
absence of mechanisms to signal and commit to the quality of
drugs, the market for drugs may become a ‘market for lemons’:
a smaller market in which only low quality drugs are sold, by
non-trustworthy sellers.” 21 Here, the FDA’s purpose is less to
protect the public from dangerous drugs than to provide the public with accurate signals about drug quality.22
This view, too has been criticized. Richard Epstein, for example, has argued that the need for certification cannot justify
the breadth of the FDA’s powers, and particularly the power that
the Agency has to ban products from the market. 23 Epstein contends that this power should be removed, and that the FDA
should compete as a certifier with private-sector entities, such
as trade associations or nonprofits.24 If the central aim of the
Agency is simply to evaluate evidence that already exists, he argues, this work could be done by many entities. 25
The market-for-lemons justification has difficulty accounting for much of the power that the FDA has long wielded over
drug companies. The paternalism justification seems difficult to
square with what many people believe government respect for
autonomy requires, particularly as regards the very ill. There is,
however, a third and more powerful justification for the FDA’s
power over drug marketing.
As Rebecca Eisenberg has suggested, the FDA’s modern approach to drug regulation can best be understood through the

19. See infra Part II.
20. See, e.g., HENRY G. GRABOWSKI & JOHN M. VERNON, THE REGULATION
OF PHARMACEUTICALS 7 (1983).
21. Katz, supra note 13, at 11.
22. Id. at 35.
23. Epstein, supra note 14, at 3-4.
24. Id. at 4, 6–8. For responses to Epstein’s points, see Katz, supra note 13,
at 34–36; and Ralph F. Hall, Right Question, Wrong Answer: A Response to Professor Epstein and the “Permititis” Challenge, 94 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 50
(2010).
25. Epstein, supra note 14, at 4, 6–8.
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lens of innovation policy. 26 The account begins with the economics of information production. Pharmaceuticals are very complex
products, whose effects can be understood only through sophisticated and costly empirical studies. These studies often enroll
hundreds or thousands of patients, and typically take many
years and many millions of dollars to complete. 27 Clinical trial
results are also classic public goods: they are nonrivalrous and
nonexcludable. 28 Unregulated markets are therefore likely to
produce them in inadequate supply.29 Patents are one means of
providing market incentives to produce trial data, but they provide asymmetric incentives. (Data and marketing exclusivities
operate similarly to patents for these purposes.) 30 An originator
company holding a patent on a compound has reason to invest in
positive evidence about a drug, because it can exclude others
from recouping the benefits of the information by monopolizing
the drug.31 But it also has high-powered incentives to avoid or
hide negative information about the drug.32
Competitors can profit by producing negative information
about the originator’s drug but not to the same degree. 33 They
may sell a competing product, but there will often also be other
competitors, meaning that there is a free rider concern: many
26. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 348.
27. AYLIN SERTKAYA ET AL., E. RESEARCH GRP., EXAMINATION OF CLINICAL
TRIAL COSTS AND BARRIERS FOR DRUG DEVELOPMENT 4-1 to 4-2 (2014), https://
aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/77166/rpt_erg.pdf (analyzing costs of clinical trials for drug development).
28. Clinical trial results can be kept secret, but like many other information
goods, their value cannot be realized without sharing them.
29. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation
of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 623 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed.,
1962) (“[ F ]or optimal allocation to invention[,] it would be necessary for the
government or some other Agency not governed by profit-and-loss criteria to
finance research and invention.”).
30. Marketing and data protection generate a term of exclusivity because
they prevent registration of a generic unless the competing company conducts
its own costly trials. Because they also reward invention via the market, they
create a bias toward positive information.
31. Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and
the Limit of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1924 (2013).
32. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 370 (“[ F ]rom the perspective of the manufacturer, rigorous clinical trials of off-label uses may be as likely to diminish
the value of a particular product as to enhance it.”); see also Kapczynski & Syed,
supra note 31, at 1923–28 (2013) (discussing these incentives, and the general
problem that markets conditioned by exclusive rights have producing adequate
negative information about products).
33. Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 31, at 1927.
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competitors can benefit if one of them invests in negative information about a patented drug, but only one company benefits
from positive information. And patents cannot solve the free
rider problem here, because negative information about a drug
is difficult to exclude even in the presence of patents. 34
The problem is not just theoretical. We now know of prominent examples where companies have designed trials to avoid
learning about potentially deadly side effects of their drugs. (As
this reveals, the FDA has also not always been able to adequately police the problem in practice.) Consider the history of
rofecoxib (Vioxx), a pain-killer developed by Merck that became
popular because it reportedly had fewer side effects than alternatives like aspirin.35 Early in the development process, Merck
scientists raised concerns that the drug might have unintended
cardiovascular side effects. 36 Despite this, none of the studies
Merck conducted for FDA approval “were designed to evaluate
cardiovascular risk.” 37 Merck also manipulated the presentation
of its data in published studies to obscure evidence of increased
cardiovascular risk. 38 The drug stayed on the market from 1999
to 2004, when it was “voluntarily” withdrawn.39 By that time,
nearly 30,000 people had brought legal claims against the company for cardiac events that occurred while taking the drug. 40
34. As Talha Syed and I describe:
Positive information is easier to render excludable than negative information, because of its closer nexus to a tangible, physical product. A
company that sought to profit from a patent on negative information
about a drug would need to track either thoughts or abstention from
purchasing. Even if monitoring such intangibles across a large number
of individuals were technically feasible, it is doubtful that such monitoring would be economically viable and, in any event, it would bump
up against deeply entrenched privacy norms against invasive mental
surveillance.
Id. at 1926. Excludability, as we show,
is highly variable across information goods, and is affected not only by
formal legal entitlements, but also by existing technologies for detecting or tracing such uses (and their costs); existing social norms regarding “acceptable” or “reasonable” enforcement efforts (in light of concerns about privacy, freedom of thought and speech, and so forth); and
the existing institutions—or social roles, relations, and organizational
forms—within which the predominant uses of the good will be made.
Id. at 1903.
35. Harlan Krumholz et al., What Have We Learnt from Vioxx?, 334 BRIT.
MED. J. 120, 120 (2007).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 121.
39. Id. at 122.
40. Id. at 120.
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Such suits may create incentives to disclose negative information earlier. But they operate ex post, and are contingent
themselves on balanced information production—for how can
plaintiffs show harm without evidence of such harm in the first
place? 41 In the Vioxx case, the key evidence was belatedly developed only through FDA oversight. Merck had to conduct new
studies when it sought a new indication for the drug, and it was
in this process that the company was pushed to study serious
cardiovascular events. 42
Notice that the issue here is not that it is difficult to interpret information about drugs without expertise. That is the point
of the certification justification: there is a lot of information out
there, and someone has to understand or translate it. Rather,
the problem here is an information production problem. It is
hard to generate that information in the first place, and in balanced fashion, negative as well as positive. Marketing restrictions are the stick that complements the carrot provided by
patents and data exclusivity. 43
There are many aspects of the FDA’s modern approach to
drug regulation that become more intelligible when understood
through the lens of information production.44 For example, the
FDA restricts off-label marketing, but not off-label prescribing. 45
Drugs are approved for particular uses. Those uses are described
on the drug label, which in turn defines the limits of a company’s
legitimate marketing—but not a doctor’s legitimate prescribing.
If a cholesterol drug is approved for use in individuals with a
history of heart attacks, doctors may prescribe it to individuals
who have no such history, and are at lower risk of cardiovascular
events (for example, based on blood lipid levels). The company,
41. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 387 (“[G]iven that tort law places the
burden of proof upon plaintiffs, drug manufacturers might minimize their liability exposure by remaining ignorant and keeping consumers ignorant of the
effects of their products.”).
42. See Krumholz, supra note 35, at 121 & n.9 (noting that a clear safety
signal was identified in the process of a supplemental new drug application, and
that this led the safety board to “recommended that an analysis plan be developed to examine serious cardiovascular events”); see also Eisenberg, supra note
5, at 378 (noting the role of the FDA).
43. Ian Ayres & Amy Kapczynski, Innovation Sticks: The Limited Case for
Penalizing Failures to Innovate, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1781, 1785 (2015).
44. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 349.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2012)
(“Once FDA-approved, prescription drugs can be prescribed by doctors for both
FDA-approved and -unapproved uses; the FDA generally does not regulate how
physicians use approved drugs.”).
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however, may not market it for those purposes unless it proves
to the FDA that its benefits outweigh the risks in that population.
From a paternalistic standpoint, this seems odd, or even discriminatory. Off-label uses are demonstrably riskier than on-label uses.46 Drugs that are effective for one indication can be ineffective or even harmful when used for another indication. 47
The risk-benefit ratio of a drug is also not the same for different
populations: counterintuitively, when people have less severe
disease, drugs often are more relatively risky, because the benefits associated with the drug are smaller, but the side effects the
same.48 This is one reason evidence of the benefits and risks of a
drug must be considered anew for each indication. But as Eisenberg put it:
If off-label uses of drugs threaten patient safety, then why permit
them? On the other hand, if off-label uses do not threaten patient safety
enough to prohibit them, then why not promote, rather than prohibit,
the dissemination of any information about these uses that will help
physicians make better choices for their patients? 49

The restriction on off-label marketing is puzzling if the purpose of drug regulation is primarily paternalistic. But it makes
sense from an information production standpoint. Restricting
off-label marketing gives companies incentives to invest in developing evidence about new uses.50 Companies, unlike doctors,
are in a good position to develop that data. They have expertise
in trial design. They also typically hold patents or enjoy other
46. Jennifer R. Bellis et al., Adverse Drug Reactions and Off-Label and Unlicensed Medicines in Children: A Nested Case-Control Study of Inpatients in a
Pediatric Hospital, 11 BMC MED. 238, 238 (2013) (showing drugs prescribed offlabel for pediatric populations pose a 2.25 times higher risk of adverse effects
than do drugs approved for use in children).
47. For example, tiagabine (Gabitril), approved to reduce the risk of seizures in people diagnosed with epilepsy, in fact caused seizures in patients who
were administered the drug for other disorders. See Charlene M. Flowers et al.,
Seizure Activity and Off-Label Use of Tiagabine, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 773, 773
(2006).
48. The benefits of potent opioids, for example, may outweigh the risks for
certain kinds of severe pain. But for those suffering chronic mild pain, the benefits are smaller, and the risks—for example of addiction—relatively more significant. See William B. Schultz, Trump’s New FDA Commissioner Has a
Huge Decision to Make, WASH. POST (May 16, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-new-fda-commissioner-has-a-huge
-decision-to-make/2017/05/16/4ee187f8-3667-11e7-b412-62beef8121f7_
story.html.
49. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 370.
50. Id.
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kinds of exclusivity that can help them to recoup the costs of such
research.
Eisenberg points to several other aspects of the FDA’s approach to drug regulation that are also easier to understand from
the perspective of information production. The FDA requires
companies to produce much more extensive information about
medicines than about dietary supplements before each can be
marketed. 51 Supplements can also be dangerous, so she argues
that the difference makes sense less as an expression of paternalistic values than as an expression of differing dynamics of information production. Dietary supplements are natural products, and so less amenable to patents.52 Using marketing
restrictions to encourage evidence production about supplements via the private market could plausibly push supplements
out of the market rather than produce good evidence about supplements. 53
Similarly, the FDA’s regime governing the use of experimental drugs makes little sense from a paternalistic standpoint,
but much more sense viewed through the lens of information production. For example, in general, it is illegal for individuals to
import medical products that are not approved in the United
States, 54 but the FDA provides a discretionary exemption for
personal use in certain situations, such as when the product is
for the treatment of a serious condition. 55 It also allows individuals who are seriously ill to choose to take experimental drugs
via its compassionate-use program, and it approves nearly all

51. Id. at 379.
52. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66,
66 (“Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.”).
53. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 379–80.
54. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to subsection (b) or (j) of this section is effective with
respect to such drug.”).
55. Id. § 384(j)(1)(B) (allowing FDA to “exercise discretion to permit individuals to make such importations in circumstances in which—(i) the importation is clearly for personal use . . . and (ii) the prescription drug or device imported does not appear to present an unreasonable risk to the individual”);
Personal Importation, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/ImportProgram/
ImportBasics/ucm432661.htm (last visited June 18, 2018) (describing criteria
for personal importation of unapproved drugs).
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such requests.56 But the FDA has historically not allowed companies to market to patients in these same circumstances.57 This
reflects less a commitment to protect patients from risk than it
does a commitment to protect a system of evidence production.
Drug companies are well situated to respond to marketing restrictions by producing evidence, but individual patients are not.
Finally, notice one additional puzzle that the information
production perspective can help resolve. If the FDA is needed
merely to inform consumers, then it is hard to see—as Epstein
argues—why it can go beyond certifying the effects of a drug, to
ban a drug from the market altogether. But from an information
production standpoint, power over marketing is essential. The
ability to ban marketing is a stick that the FDA requires to ensure that companies produce balanced information about drugs
and submit it to regulators for review.
Shifting our focus to the domain of information production
also allows us to see another market failure that the FDA seeks
to solve, here related not to the production of evidence but to its
validation. Unregulated markets can neither produce balanced
information about drugs nor rigorously evaluate evidence produced about drugs. The notion that the FDA can serve as merely
one certifier among many neglects two problems. One relates to
secrecy and the other to financing.
First, accurately evaluating clinical trial evidence requires
access to all of the associated clinical trial data. But no entity
other than the FDA has the right to demand access to all of the
data associated with a drug, and no third party can expect routinely to receive it. Epstein seems to envision that third-parties
will be able to consult the literature to make informed judgments

56. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb (providing for expanded access to unapproved therapies and diagnostics). According to a 2017 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, of the nearly 5800 expanded access requests received by the
FDA from 2012 to 2015, the FDA allowed ninety-nine percent to proceed, and
for emergency single-patient requests, the Agency typically responds within
hours. GAO, GAO-17-564, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION: INVESTIGATIONAL
NEW DRUGS: FDA HAS TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE EXPANDED ACCESS PROGRAM
BUT SHOULD FURTHER CLARIFY HOW ADVERSE EVENTS DATA ARE USED 17, 19
(2017), http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/685729.pdf.
57. Ashley Ochs, A Study in Futility: Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
Developmental Drugs Will Not Expand Access to Experimental Drugs for the
Terminally Ill, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 559, 570 (2009) (discussing the need for
testing completion before marketing will be approved). For possible implications
of the new federal right-to-try law on this restriction, see infra Part II.
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about the value of medicines.58 About half of all completed clinical trials, however, are not published.59 Recent evidence also
suggests that the published literature is biased toward positive
studies. In a 2008 paper, for example, researchers compared
FDA reviews of antidepressant drugs with the published literature. 60 Only one study that the FDA considered positive was not
published. 61 In all but three cases, however, studies that the
FDA considered negative were not published at all or were published and described as positive. 62 With full access to the study
results, a reviewer would have seen that around half of the studies were negative, while with access to only the published results, a reviewer would have believed that ninety-four percent of
the trials conducted were positive.63 Reviewers relying on published evidence will systematically overestimate the effectiveness of medicines, if, as it appears, the literature is systematically skewed.
The problem goes beyond publication bias. There are excellent nonprofit groups, the Cochrane Group for example, that
seek to generate neutral, expert evidence about the effects of
drugs by conducting metastudies of all of the available trials. 64
Those studies are often considered the gold standard in metaresearch, and have had a significant influence on prescribing
guidelines.65 But they are typically based on incomplete data.
58. See Epstein, supra note 14.
59. Carolina Riveros et al., Timing and Completeness of Trial Results
Posted at ClinicalTrials.gov and Published in Journals, 10 PLOS
MED. e1001566 (2013); Joseph S. Ross et al., Publication of NIH Funded Trials
Registered in Clinicaltrials.Gov: Cross Sectional Analysis, 344 BRIT. MED. J. 1,
3 (2012).
60. Erick H. Turner et al., Selective Publication of Antidepressant Trials
and Its Influence on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252 (2008).
61. Id. at 256 (table showing one (3%) unpublished positive study and 37
(97%) published positive studies).
62. Id. (table showing sixteen (67%) unpublished negative studies, five
(21%) published negative studies that conflict with FDA decision, and three
(12%) published negative studies that agree with FDA decision).
63. Id. at 255 (“Overall, 48 of the 51 published studies were reported to
have positive results (94%). According to the FDA, 38 of the 74 registered studies had positive results (51%).”).
64. See About Us, COCHRANE, http://www.cochrane.org/about-us (last visited June 18, 2018).
65. Marie Baudard et al., Impact of Searching Clinical Trial Registries in
Systematic Reviews of Pharmaceutical Treatments: Methodological Systematic
Review and Reanalysis of Meta-Analyses, 356 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 1 (2017).
(“Systematic reviews are considered to provide the highest level of evidence . . .
[and form the basis] of clinical practice guidelines . . . .”); Richard Smith, The
Cochrane Collaboration at 20, 347 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 1 (2013) (“Many see
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The depth of the problem has only recently begun to be understood. For example, several years after the approval of oseltamivir (Tamiflu), a drug used to treat influenza, concerns were
raised about the efficacy of the drug. 66 The Cochrane Group published a metastudy of the evidence that was largely positive, 67
but an outside researcher pointed out potential problems with
some of the unpublished studies, and the Cochrane reviewers decided to undertake further investigation. 68 The company, Roche,
was unwilling to turn over the data underlying the unpublished
trials that the reviewers requested. 69 Eventually, after four
years of work that included a public campaign for release of the
data by a prominent medical journal, the researchers were able
to access all published and unpublished data, and conducted an
updated review. 70 They reversed their earlier findings, and concluded that the drug could not be affirmatively recommended to
reduce symptoms. 71 The group also recommended further
study—but unlike the FDA, had no tools to press the company to
comply.
The example shows the issue in stark relief: we now know
that the gold standard for clinical metaresearch is often based
on incomplete information—information that may also be systematically biased, because it too must typically rely substantially on publicly available data. Groups like Cochrane have no
entitlement to access data held by companies, and they obtain
secret data only rarely and with great effort. The FDA, in contrast, does have that entitlement. 72 It receives enormous quantities of data that companies do not make public. These include
Cochrane reviews as the gold standard, and the collaboration has played a major role in promoting evidence based practice.”).
66. Tom Jefferson et al., Neuraminidase Inhibitors for Preventing and
Treating Influenza in Healthy Adults: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis,
339 BRIT. MED. J. 1, 5–7 (2009).
67. Id. at 2 (noting that the review “found positive evidence” with regard to
the ability of neuraminidase inhibitors to prevent or ameliorate influenza, to
interrupt transmission of the virus, and to reduce influenza related complications).
68. Id. at 2.
69. Peter Doshi, Neuraminidase inhibitors—the story behind the Cochrane
review, 339 BMJ 5164, 5194 (2009).
70. TOM JEFFERSON ET AL., COCHRANE DATABASE SYST. REV.
NEURAMINIDASE INHIBITORS FOR PREVENTING AND TREATING INFLUENZA IN
ADULTS AND CHILDREN (REVIEW) (2014) (reviewing all the clinical study reports
of published and unpublished clinical trials).
71. Id. at 2–6.
72. Amy Kapczynski & Jeanie Kim, Clinical Trial Transparency: The FDA
Should and Can Do More, 45 J. LAW MED. ETHICS 33, 33 (2018).
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trial protocols (necessary to interpret data produced in trials),
summaries of trial results (such as the clinical study reports that
companies prepare for the Agency), and the underlying analyzable datasets—none of which are routinely available to researchers. 73
FDA reviewers may also query applicants for more data and
dig deeper into the record to validate and—if needed—correct
data. For example, after postmarket safety concerns emerged in
association with the diabetes medicine rosiglitazone (Avandia),
the FDA conducted a manual review of adverse event forms submitted to the Agency, collected additional data for hundreds of
trial participants, and found a number of deaths that had not
previously been recorded. 74 This is a good example of the extraordinary complexity of trial evaluation. Just a few missed deaths
in a trial—stemming from inadequate follow-up, or misreporting
that is either accidental or deliberate—can translate into hundreds or even thousands of deaths in a population, once a drug
is widely prescribed.
One solution to this problem is simple transparency. 75 In
practice, transparency has been anything but simple. Companies
resist turning over protocols, summary data, and especially analyzable datasets to researchers, citing concerns about commercial confidentiality as well as patient privacy. 76 The FDA has
long repeated these concerns and released most such data only
after protracted litigation via FOIA—and some not even then.77
The FDA and drug companies are likely wrong that clinical trial
data relevant to the assessment of the safety or efficacy of a drug
categorically should be considered commercially confidential and
kept secret. 78 Where manufacturers’ concerns are genuine and
73. Id. at 34
74. FDA, Joint Meeting of the Endocrinologic and Metabolic Drugs Advisory Comm. and the Drug Safety and Risk Mgmt. Advisory Comm., Readjudication of the Rosiglitazone Evaluated for Cardiovascular Outcomes and Regulation of Glycemia in Diabetes Trial (RECORD) (June 5–6, 2013); Kenneth W.
Mahaffey et al., Results of a Reevaluation of Cardiovascular Outcomes in the
RECORD Trial, 166 AMERICAN HEART J. 240, 242 (2013).
75. Eisenberg suggests this, for example. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at
383.
76. Kapczynski & Kim, supra note 72, at 34.
77. Id.
78. See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Confidentiality Laws
and Secrecy In Medical Research: Improving Public Access To Data on Drug
Safety, 26 HEALTH AFF. 483, 487–88 (2007); see also Corn Prods. Refining Co. v.
Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 431–32 (1919) (“[ I ]t is too plain for argument that a manufacturer or vendor has no constitutional right to sell goods without giving to
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not contrary to the public’s interest in understanding the quality
of a product—where, for example, companies wish to protect information about manufacturing processes—the information in
question can readily be redacted.79 (There are also accepted protocols for sharing data while protecting patient privacy.) 80 But
there is undoubtedly an awkward fit between a profit-motivated
system for clinical data development and the call for radical
transparency. Moreover, even if all data routinely given to the
FDA were made available to outside researchers, those researchers would not have the right that FDA reviewers have to demand
a response, and more data, from companies. Even the most ambitious transparency agenda cannot give private entities the
powers possessed by the FDA without turning them, in effect,
into decentralized and smaller versions of a regulatory Agency.
Even if the access-to-data problem were solved, the financing of validation efforts would still be an issue. The expense associated with rigorous validation of study results is substantial.
The FDA’s Office of New Drugs, for example, has a staff of more
than 1000. 81 New drug approval packages submitted to the FDA
routinely run in the hundreds of thousands of pages, and analysis of this data demands a great deal of expertise and time. 82
While groups like Cochrane or formulary committees may have
the capacity to consult the published literature and, in rare
cases, seek some additional underlying summary data, this is
the very tip of the clinical data iceberg. The FDA reviews not
only clinical data from all trial phases, in primary as well as
the purchaser fair information of what it is that is being sold. The right of a
manufacturer to maintain secrecy as to his compounds and processes must be
held subject to the right of the State, in the exercise of its police power and in
promotion of fair dealing, to require that the nature of the product be fairly set
forth.”); Epstein, supra note 14, at 34 n.135 (declaring support for “the publication of trade secret information needed to evaluate serious health risks”).
79. Kapczynski & Kim, supra note 72, at 34.
80. Id. at 33.
81. Zachary Brennan, FDA’s Office of New Drugs Director to Retire, RAPS
(Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2016/12/05/26301/
FDA%E2%80%99s-Office-of-New-Drugs-Director-to-Retire.
82. Publication and Disclosure Issues in Antidepressant Pediatric Clinical
Trials: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 36–37 (2004) (statement of Janet
Woodcock, Deputy Comm’r for Operations, FDA), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/CHRG-108hhrg96094/pdf/CHRG-108hhrg96094.pdf (noting that raw data
from drug submissions runs in the “hundreds or thousands of volumes” and that
“there are very few individuals who are capable of going through all that at that
level”); see also id. at 179 (Statement of John R. Hayes, Product Team Leader,
Eli Lilly Company) (“We recently had a new drug application that was 417,000
hard copy pages for a single indication.”).
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summary form, but also evaluates animal studies, pharmacokinetic information, and postmarket adverse events. 83 Given their
limited capacity, third-party groups like Cochrane focus on a
limited set of drugs and primarily consult secondary sources rather than the voluminous primary data. Academics have little
reason to do reanalysis of this sort, because it is unlikely that
any particular study will generate new knowledge, and replication studies are difficult to publish if they indeed validate the
initial results. 84
Might insurance companies take on a larger role in validating studies, because it would serve their interest in “controlling
drug costs,” as Eisenberg wonders? 85 Not likely, and certainly
not at the scale undertaken by the FDA. First, there is a classical
principal-agent problem: insurers have reason to focus only on
clinical evidence associated with high cost drugs, and have incentive to find fault with them in order to deny coverage. Collective action issues present another problem: if insurers were to
invest in hiring hundreds of staff members to undertake the
same work that the FDA undertakes and share the results publicly, other insurers could free ride. If they kept the results a secret—perhaps difficult, given patients’ need to understand the
basis for coverage decisions—then their work could not serve the
role of public validation of the quality and safety of drug products.
The FDA, in sum, plays a critical role in the production and
validation of information about medicines—one that is essential
to the production of balanced evidence about the harms and benefits of medicines, and to the intensive work needed to evaluate
the studies that companies conduct. The reason that we apply
this regime to medicines and not to all products has to do with
the substantial risks and benefits associated with drugs, and in
this way the Agency’s role is fundamentally about protecting the
public. But the Agency protects the public not by making choices
for it or by certifying the truth but by generating and validating
information about medicines. These aims, moreover, are inter-

83. Lee et al., Publication of Clinical Trials Supporting Successful New
Drug Applications: A Literature Analysis, 5 PLOS MED 191, 191 (2008).
84. YALE COLLABORATION FOR RESEARCH INTEGRITY & TRANSPARENCY,
PROMOTING TRANSPARENCY IN CLINICAL RESEARCH: WHY AND HOW 9–10
(2017), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/crit/crit_white_paper_
november_2017_best_promoting_transparency_in_clinical_research_why_and_
how.pdf.
85. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 374.
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twined: if no entity had the resources to closely monitor the conduct and results of trials, it would be trivially easy for companies
to slant the data or summaries in favor of their products. Both
tasks are critical, and neither can be performed adequately by
an unregulated market.
II. WHY RECENT REFORMS THREATEN THE FDA’S
INFORMATION PRODUCTION AND VALIDATION
FUNCTION
From this perspective, we can see better why so-called rightto-try laws and recent First Amendment cases are so troubling.
We can also see the enormous stakes of how the FDA implements
its new authority under the 21st Century Cures Act. 86 Changes
that reduce the power of the FDA’s stick, as these do, threaten
our system for producing and validating evidence about medicines.
Prior to the new right-to-try law, federal statutes and regulations already provided a pathway for patients to access unapproved compounds. 87 Under that approach, patients with a serious or life-threatening disease can request permission from the
FDA to use an unproven therapy if they cannot access other satisfactory approved treatments or a clinical trial. 88 The FDA
grants ninety-nine percent of all such requests.89 Companies,
however, routinely refuse to supply investigational drugs to patients, leaving many who are seriously ill without the ability to
access compounds that they wish to try. 90 Experts commonly
have cited two reasons that companies do not more frequently
grant patient requests. By regulation, companies may not profit
from expanded access uses.91 Providing drugs to patients who
are often sicker than the typical intended population also risks
86. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).
87. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a) (2017).
88. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.305(a); Expanded Access: Information for Patients,
FDA (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Other/ExpandedAccess/
ucm20041768.htm.
89. Jonathan P. Jarow et al., Ten-Year Experience for the Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research, Part 2: FDA’s Role in Ensuring Patient Safety, 51(2)
THERAPEUTIC INNOVATION & REG. SCI. 246, 246 (2017). In eleven percent of the
cases, the FDA also requested changes to protect patients, suggesting that the
Agency’s review provides important input to patients and companies. Id. at 248.
90. See Alison Bateman-House et al., “Right to Try” Won’t Give Patients Access to Experimental Drugs. Here’s What Will, HEALTH AFFAIRS: BLOG (May 3,
2017), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170503.059926/full.
91. 21 C.F.R. § 312.8(d)(1) (limiting a company’s recoverable costs to “direct
costs”).
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additional adverse events that may mar the record of an unproven therapy and make approval more complex. 92
State and federal right-to-try laws were promoted—most
prominently by the Goldwater Institute—as a way to increase
access to experimental therapies.93 The recently passed federal
version allows patients with life-threatening diseases or conditions to bypass the existing expanded access process. 94 It forbids
the FDA to use any data arising from uses under the new pathway to negatively impact drug approval decisions, with certain
narrow exceptions. 95 The law also limits liability for companies
and prescribers “unless the relevant conduct constitutes reckless
or willful misconduct, gross negligence, or an intentional tort under any applicable State law.” 96 Because it does not explicitly restrict what companies can charge, some argue that the law
“open[s] the door for companies to profit from selling unproven
drugs.” 97 The law does refer to existing FDA regulations that
permit companies only to charge “direct costs,” but these regulations might be changed. 98
The law’s provisions mainly target the FDA, despite the fact
that the Agency has not been the main barrier to access.99 The
92. See Bateman-House et al., supra note 90.
93. See id.; see also Goldwater Inst., supra note 15.
94. Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-176, sec. 2(a), § 561B(a)(1)(A); see
also Alison Bateman-House & Christopher T. Robinson, The Federal Right to
Try Act of 2017—A Wrong Turn for Access to Investigational Drugs and the Path
Forward, 178 JAMA Internal Med. 321, 321 (2018) (summarizing the Senate
Bill, S 204, that was the basis for the adopted law). The law applies to medicines
that are in development and have completed only the most minimal (phase I)
tests. Pub L. No. 115-176, sec. 2(a), § 561B(a)(2)(A). Phase I trials give no information about efficacy and provide only preliminary information on safety, typically drawn from tests on healthy volunteers rather than in persons with the
disease. See The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, FDA (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/
consumers/ucm143534.htm.
95. Pub. L. No. 115-176, sec. 2(a), § 561B(c)(1) (“[ T ]he Secretary may not
use a clinical outcome associated with the use of an eligible investigational drug
pursuant to this section to delay or adversely affect the review or approval of
such drug [unless the sponsor requests it or the Secretary finds it] is critical to
determining the safety of the eligible investigational drug.”).
96. Id. at sec. 2(b)(1)(B).
97. Bateman-House & Robertson, supra note 94, at 321.
98. Pub. L. No. 115-176, sec. 2(a), § 561B(b) (citing 21 C.F.R. § 312.8(d)(1)).
99. Bateman-House & Robertson, supra note 94, at 321. In addition to the
FDA’s rapid review and approval of almost all requests, when the FDA receives
reports of adverse events in the expanded access program, it considers them in
context and gives them very little weight in the approval process. U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EXPANDED ACCESS TO INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS FOR
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law also explicitly states that companies have no obligation to
provide patients with access to experimental therapies. 100 It will
therefore likely do little to help patients.101 But by further limiting the FDA’s role in the process, it may mean that patients end
up with less information about medicines. If new regulations
permitted companies to profit from unapproved uses, the results
would be more troubling still. Companies would have less incentive to quickly complete trials to gain approval.
Once we appreciate the importance of marketing restrictions in our system of producing information about drugs, it
becomes clear that the push to deregulate access to experimental
therapies comes along with grave risks. More targeted approaches that seek to reduce the administrative burden of the
existing expanded access program, and to improve patients’ and
companies’ understanding of the process, would better serve patients’ need for treatment, while also protecting their need for
answers.102

TREATMENT USE: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 18–19 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/
downloads/drugs/guidances/ucm351261.pdf. (“In a very small number of cases,
[FDA has used] adverse event information from expanded access [in the safety
assessment of a drug] . . . . FDA reviewers of these adverse event data understand the context in which the expanded access use was permitted [(e.g., use in
patients with serious or immediately life-threatening diseases or administered
in a clinical setting (not clinical trial)] and will evaluate any adverse event data
obtained from an expanded access submission within that context . . . . Expanded access INDs (Investigational New Drugs) and protocols are generally
not designed to determine the efficacy of a drug; however, the expanded access
regulations do not prohibit the collection of such data. Because expanded access
INDs or protocols typically involve uncontrolled exposures (with limited data
collection), it is unlikely that an expanded access IND or protocol would yield
efficacy information that would be useful to FDA in considering a drug’s effectiveness.”).
100. Pub. L. No. 115-176, sec. 2(b)(2).
101. See, e.g., Bateman-House & Robinson, supra note 94; see also Vibhav
Rangarajan, The “Cruel Joke” of Compassionate Use and Right to Try: Pharma
Companies Don’t Have to Comply, STAT NEWS (June 5, 2018), https://www
.statnews.com/2018/06/05/right-to-try-compassionate-use-pharma-compliance.
Even if companies were eventually allowed to charge for such medicines, if insurance coverage is not mandated for such uses, patients will likely have difficultly covering the costs on their own. Most state laws explicitly say that insurance plans are not required to cover experimental uses. Kearns & BatemanHouse, supra note 17, at 171.
102. Bateman-House et al., supra note 90 (recommending a series of changes
of this sort, including improved communication, and eliminating the requirement for an institutional review board to review requests for individual patients).
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The recent First Amendment cases are similarly troubling
once we have in view the role that the FDA’s restrictions on marketing play in information production and validation. Commercial speech has long received only limited constitutional protection, but recent Supreme Court cases have begun to blur the
lines between commercial speech and more protected public or
political speech. 103 In response to these cases, lower courts have
begun to call into question the constitutionality of the FDA’s
longstanding approach to evidence production as applied to offlabel uses.
As described above, under current law, to be permitted to
market a drug for a particular use, a company must first produce
data that the drug is safe and efficacious for that use and submit
such data to regulators. A recent Second Circuit case, United
States v. Caronia, suggested that this longstanding approach
may today be unconstitutional. 104 The majority viewed the primary aim of the Agency’s restriction on off-label promotion as
protecting patients from unsafe medicines. 105 It concluded that
marketing restrictions did not “directly advance” an interest in
patient safety because if this is the government’s aim, it makes
little sense to permit off-label prescribing but forbid off-label promotion. 106 It concluded that the FDA could restrict marketing
that it could show to be false or misleading, but that it could not
constitutionally restrict marketing merely because it is off-label. 107
The Second Circuit left open additional arguments that the
Agency may make in its defense,108 though these were rejected
in a subsequent district court case, Amarin Pharma, Inc. v.
FDA. 109 In that case, a company that made a pharmaceutical derived from fish oil wished to market it broadly for an unapproved
103. See Sorrell v. IMS, 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011).
104. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 162–69 (2d Cir. 2012).
105. Id. at 153.
106. Id. at 166–67 (“Prohibiting off-label promotion by a pharmaceutical
manufacturer while simultaneously allowing off-label use ‘paternalistically’ interferes with the ability of physicians and patients to receive potentially relevant treatment information; such barriers to information about off-label use
could inhibit, to the public’s detriment, informed and intelligent treatment decisions.”).
107. Id. at 168–69.
108. See id. at 162 n.9 (noting that the government might have argued, but
had not in this case, that off-label promotion was merely being used as evidence
of mislabeling).
109. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 227–28 (S.D.N.Y.
2015).
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use, despite the FDA’s conclusion that there was no reason to
think that the product provided any clinical benefit for the use
in question. 110 The court interpreted Caronia to imply that restrictions on off-label marketing were flatly unconstitutional,
and issued an order—on a preliminary injunction motion, with
neither a full record nor expert testimony—effectively adjudicating the merits of the company’s marketing claims. 111 The court
concluded, for example, that the drug could be promoted to reduce the risk of coronary artery disease, despite the FDA’s objection that there was inadequate evidence to support such a use. 112
The FDA’s contrary conclusion drew on its expert review of a
substantial body of evidence, including recent clinical studies of
other drugs that operated in a similar fashion that showed no
clinical benefit.113
Amarin’s approach replaces expert FDA reviewers with federal judges who may have no training in science, and who have
access to almost none of the data and evidence that drug reviewers enjoy. Judges have neither the skills nor the data needed to
adequately validate claims about medicines. And because the
FDA’s validation role is intertwined with its evidence production
role, Amarin’s logic also threatens to undermine the production
of evidence about new uses. As I have described elsewhere, Amarin has implications for drug-approval strategy in the future:
Once a drug is approved for any indication, it can be promoted to physicians for any use as long as a judge, not the FDA, views the marketing
to be truthful and nonmisleading . . . . The Amarin decision invites a
world where companies no longer pursue broad clinical indications for
new drugs but instead seek the narrowest possible indication for approval and then market the drug for any new use for which there is
some evidence, no matter how weak. Companies would no longer have
to conduct rigorous trials and submit, to the FDA, data demonstrating
the safety and efficacy of new uses. Such an approach would compromise the future evidence base for medicines, expose patients to a
greater risk of adverse events, and increase pharmaceutical spending
without evidence that the expenditures would help improve patients’
health. 114

110. Id. at 198.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 214, 234–35.
113. Letter from Janet Woodcock, Director, Ctr. Drug Eval. & Research,
FDA, to Steven Ketchum, President, Research & Dev., Amarin Pharma, Inc. 3
(June 5, 2015) (on file with author).
114. Jeanie Kim & Amy Kapczynski, Promotion of Drugs for Off-Label Uses:
The US Food and Drug Administration at a Crossroads, 177 JAMA INTERNAL
MED. 157, 157 (2017).
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Fortunately, Amarin is only a district court opinion. The
Second Circuit might resolve differently the argument left open
in Caronia, and other theories remain that might convince other
appellate courts. 115 But there is now significant pressure on the
Agency to voluntarily relinquish its power over off-label uses,
and there are some indications that it may be considering this
approach.116
The risks of this to the Agency’s information production and
validation function, again, are substantial. If companies continue to press this line of cases, and courts agree, what might be
done in response? It is worth noting that private industry is not
the only entity that can fund clinical research. If substantial
public funding were directed to study off-label uses, then additional marketing of such uses might be compatible with continued evidence production.117
Finally, the impact of the 21st Century Cures Act is also
clarified by an appreciation for the FDA’s information production role. Broadly summarizing, the Act encourages the FDA to
approve drugs more quickly and with less evidence. 118 For example, it urges the Agency to increase its reliance on “biomarkers
and surrogate measures” in the drug approval process, along
with “‘real world evidence’—observational data arising from routine clinical use, rather than prospectively collected data from
randomized controlled trials.” 119
In theory, it may be possible to approve drugs with less evidence, and gather more evidence after approval, when the drug
is in use in the wider population. In part with this in mind, the
FDA has already begun to employ forms of accelerated approval,
and has increasingly relied on nonclinical endpoints as markers

115. Id. at 158 (noting that the FDA has a strong argument that its approach
is one that does not penalize speech as such but that merely uses speech for
evidentiary purposes); see also Amy Kapczynski, Free Speech and Pharmaceutical Regulation—Fishy Business, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 295, 296 (describing why the correct application of the Central Hudson test would also favor the
FDA).
116. Kim & Kapczynski, supra note 114, at 157.
117. The point must be taken with caution, though, since it might be harder
to enroll trials if patients have widespread access to drugs for off-label uses and
if drugs are being widely marketed for those uses.
118. Betty Lengyel-Gomez, 21st Century Cures Act A Summary, HIMSS
NEWS, http://www.himss.org/news/21st-century-cures-act-summary (last updated Feb. 20, 2017).
119. Kesselheim & Avorn, supra note 3, at 581–82.
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of success. 120 But there are costs as well as benefits of approving
drugs on the basis of more preliminary trials, and neither has
been well-characterized. For example, we know of many cases
where early and small clinical trials suggested benefits but
larger and more definitive trials revealed that drugs did not
work or even caused harm. 121 We do not yet know how representative these examples are. Recent evidence also shows that
drugs that are approved through accelerated pathways are more
likely to be subject to serious postmarket safety warnings, indicating that when the FDA accelerates its review this comes at
some cost to patient safety. 122 But again, we have little sense of
how substantial these risks are on the whole, nor how large the
associated benefits of faster review may be.
The FDA has also already begun to use surrogate markers
extensively. 123 Surrogate markers can make trials faster and
cheaper because they may be assessed more quickly or easily
than clinical benefits. For example, a trial might measure cholesterol levels instead of cardiovascular deaths, or tumor shrinkage instead of survival time. But if these markers turn out not
to correlate with clinical outcomes, approving drugs on this basis
increases risks to patients (because drugs almost always have
associated risks) and wastes scarce resources.
Are scientists and regulators good at selecting surrogate
markers? Existing studies give cause for concern. 124 For example, a recent systematic review of drugs approved by the FDA
over a twelve-year period showed that for those approved on the
basis of surrogate markers, “less than one-tenth . . . had a published peer-reviewed post-market study establishing that the
120. Suzanne White Junod, FDA, FDA and Clinical Trials: A Short History,
https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/history/FOrgsHistory/evolvingpowers/
ucm304485.htm (last updated Feb. 1, 2018).
121. See generally Zachary Brennan, Twenty-Two Case Studies Where
Phase Two and Phase Three Trials Had Divergent Results, STATE NEWS SERV.,
Jan. 19, 2017 Gale, Doc. No. A4778165802.
122. Nicholas S. Downing et al., Postmarket Safety Events Among Novel
Therapeutics Approved by the US Food and Drug Administration Between 2001
and 2010, 317 JAMA 1854, 1860–61 (2017); see also Daniel Carpenter et al.,
Drug-Review Deadlines and Safety Problems, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354, 1357
(2008) (showing increased safety issues in the postmarket phase for drugs benefiting from expedited approval and faster review times).
123. Nicholas S. Downing, et al., Clinical Trial Evidence Supporting FDA
Approval of Novel Therapeutic Agents, 2005–2012, 311 JAMA 368, 377 (2014).
124. Yale Collaboration for Research Integrity & Transparency, What’s in
Your Medicine Cabinet? Ensuring the Safety and Efficacy of Prescription Drugs,
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drug was effective based on clinical evidence.” 125 In other words,
it is likely that many drugs currently approved on the basis of
surrogate markers are never shown to be effective in clinical
terms. In another study, the authors gathered twenty years of
cardiovascular trials involving medicines and other interventions that had been published in the most prominent medical
journals. 126 They selected those that used surrogate markers,
and then searched the literature for follow on studies. Less than
one-third all of the trials that showed a positive result for a surrogate were even studied for clinical endpoints. 127 More worryingly still, when they were tested, half of the time surrogate
markers that were thought to correlate with clinical benefit in
fact did not.128
If we are to expedite the FDA’s review process and employ
more surrogate markers without compromising the FDA’s evidence production and validation function, we must shift the regulatory system to require rigorous follow-on studies that can confirm or disprove early results. Companies are already required
to conduct such studies in many cases, but here too, the early
evidence suggests that the system isn’t working well. Post-marketing studies are rarely completed on time.129 For example, in
one study of twenty-two drugs that were subject to fast-track approval by the FDA from 2009 to 2013, only half of required follow-up studies were completed within three years. 130 More troublingly still, these follow-on studies often also used surrogate or
biomarkers, rather than clinically meaningful endpoints such as
the alleviation of symptoms or improvements in morbidity or
mortality. 131 This suggests that currently the FDA is unable to
require studies to be done in a timely fashion, or to require that
125. Id. at 14 (citing Alison M. Pease et al., Postapproval Studies of Drugs
Initially Approved by the FDA on the Basis of Limited Evidence: Systematic Review, 357 BRIT. MED. J. 1680 (2017)).
126. Behnood Bikdeli et al., Two Decades of Cardiovascular Trials with Primary Surrogate Endpoints: 1990–2011, 6 JAMA 1, 4 (2017).
127. Id.
128. Id.; see also Chul Kim & Vinay Prasad, Cancer Drugs Approved on the
Basis of a Surrogate End Point and Subsequent Overall Survival: An Analysis
of 5 Years of US Food and Drug Administration Approvals, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1992, 1993–94 (2015) (showing similar results in oncology).
129. GAO, GAO-16-192: FDA EXPEDITES MANY APPLICATIONS, BUT DATA
FOR POSTAPPROVAL OVERSIGHT NEED IMPROVEMENT 22–28 (2015).
130. Huseyin Naci et al., Characteristics of Preapproval and Postapproval
Studies for Drugs Granted Accelerated Approval by the US Food and Drug Administration, 318 JAMA 626, 626 (2017).
131. Id.
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studies are done on the right outcomes. Whether this is the result of inadequate legal frameworks, insufficient resources with
the Agency, or a more fundamental political economy problem
with postmarketing requirements is not yet known.
Patients, providers, and policymakers all want better medicines, and want them faster. But clinical evidence production is
complex and takes time. When implementing the 21st Century
Cures Act, the FDA should exercise caution, and ensure that its
approach is consistent with the Agency’s critical role in producing and validating high quality information about medicines.
Moving forward to reduce the evidence required prior to approval without identifying why postmarketing studies are so often not completed in a timely fashion, and without assurances
that the Agency has the tools and resources to address the problem going forward, seems ill-advised.
CONCLUSION
The most persuasive justification for the FDA’s modern regulatory approach to drug marketing relates to the enormous
challenges associated with producing and validating high-quality information about medicines. Unregulated markets cannot
adequately perform either function, and modern FDA law is
shaped substantially by this fact. Recent challenges to the
Agency’s regulatory structure have not adequately addressed
these issues. Facing them head on allows us to see that some of
these reforms are plainly ill-advised, and that others should be
stayed until we know better how to make them compatible with
the FDA’s critical information production and validation functions.

